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The United States Supreme Court remarked in 1851 that the doc-
trine of punitive damages' was so well-entrenched in our legal system
that the question of the propriety of awarding punitive damages "will
not admit of argument." 2 Despite the Court's confident assertion, pu-
nitive damages have admitted of argument in recent years; they have
been both exalted and assailed.
On one hand, many modem courts have expanded the application
of punitive damages beyond the traditional malicious tort framework
* Assistant Professor, School of Business, Indiana University. B.A., 1971, Indiana
University; J.D., 1976, Indiana University School of Law.
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1. Punitive damages, also referred to as "exemplary," "vindictive," "punitory,"
"smart money," and "presumptive" damages, "are sums awarded apart from any compensa-
tory or nominal damages, usually as punishment or deterrent levied because of particularly
aggravated misconduct on the part of the defendant." D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 204 (1973) [hereinafter cited as DOBBS]. The type of aggravated mis-
conduct about which Professor Dobbs speaks generally is deemed to have occurred where
the defendant has committed a malicious, wanton, or intentional tort, or a reckless offense in
disregard of the rights or safety or others. See Roberts v. Pierce, 398 F.2d 954 (5th Cir.
1968); Morgan v. Bates, 390 P.2d 486 (Okla. 1964); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 908 (1939);
DOBBS, supra, at 206; Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REv. 517
(1957) [hereinafter cited as Exemplary Damages]; Note, The Assessment of Punitive Damages
Against an Entrepreneurfor the Malicious Torts of His Employees, 70 YALE L.J. 1896 (196 1)
[hereinafter cited as Malicious Torts]. One court has stated: "'To entitle a plaintiff to re-
cover exemplary damages in an action sounding in tort, the proof must show some element
of fraud, malice, or oppression. The act which constitutes the cause of action must be actu-
ated by, or accompanied with, some evil intent, or must be the result of such gross negli-
gence, such disregard of another's rights, as is deemed equivalent to such intent.'" Morgan
v. Bates, 390 P.2d 486, 488 (Okla. 1964) (quoting syllabus to Keener Oil & Gas Co. v. Stew-
art, 172 Okla. 143, 45 P.2d 121 (1935)). Moreover, they are never granted as a matter of
right but fall solely within the discretion of the jury. Crea v. Wuellner, 235 Minn. 408, 51
N.W.2d 283 (1952).
2. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851).
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to include cases involving bad faith breach of contract claims, 3 viola-
tions of civil rights,4 fraudulent violations of state securities laws, 5 and
products liability actions.6 On the other hand, forceful arguments have
been made7 that the doctrine of punitive damages should be abolished.
Although the idea of a punitive remedy in a civil case has long
3. See, e.g., Jones v. Abriani, 350 N.E.2d 635 (Ind. App. 1976); Vernon Fire & Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 161 Ind. App. 413, 316 N.E.2d 381 (1974), mod fled on other grounds, 264
Ind. 599, 349 N.E.2d 173 (1976). See generally Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of
Contract: The Reality and the Illusion ofLegal Change, 61 MINN. L. REV. 207 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as Sullivan]; Exemplary Damages, supra note 1, at 531-33; Note, The Expanding
Availability ofPunitive Damages in Contract Actions, 8 IND. L. REV. 668 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Punitive Damages in Contract Actions]; Comment, Exemplary Damages in Contract
Cases, 7 WILLIAMETTE L.J. 137 (1971).
4. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 233-34 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1978); Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d 487
(9th Cir. 1978); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 204-05 (2d Cir. 1971). But see LaReau v.
Manson, 383 F. Supp. 214, 219 (D. Conn. 1974). See generally Comment, lmplying Punitive
Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325 (1974).
5. See Comment, Punitive Damages and the Federal Securities Act." Recovery Via Pen-
dent Jurisdiction, 47 Miss. L.J. 743, 759-67 (1976), where the authors state that, while puni-
tive damages are not available under the federal securities laws, the prevailing trend allows
recovery when a state claim is joined under pendent jurisdiction. See also Comment, Puni-
tive Damagesfor Securities Regulation, 8 Hous. L. REV. 137, 149-54 (1970) (criticizing the
disallowance of punitive damages under the federal securities laws).
6. See, e.g., Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398
(1967). Cf Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967) (evidence
insufficient to impose punitive damages in drug products liability action); Moore v. Jewel
Tea Co., 116 Ill. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969), a ifd, 46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103
(1970) (punitive damages award against manufacturer of unreasonably dangerous product
upheld). See generally Igoe, Punitive Damages. An Analytical Perspective, 14 TRIAL, No-
vember 1978, at 48; Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liabilitf Litigation, 74 MICH. L.
REV. 1257 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Owen], Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance
of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 116 (1968); Robinson & Kane,
Punitive Damages in the Products Case, 15 TRIAL, January 1979, at 34; Tozer, Punitive Dam-
ages and Product Liability, 39 INS. COUNSEL J. 300 (1972); Note, Allowance ofPunitive Dam-
ages in Products Liability Claims, 6 GA. L. REV. 613 (1972); Comment, Punitive Damages in
Products Liability Cases, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 895 (1976).
7. See, e.g., Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 P. 119 (1884). In Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H.
342 (1873), the court concluded that "[t]he idea [of punitive damages] is wrong. It is a mon-
strous heresy. . . an unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body of law."
Id. at 382. See also Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 P. 1072 (1891);
Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 42 Wis. 654 (1877); 2 S. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 253 (16th ed.
1899); C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES § 77 (1935); Duffy, Punitive Damages:. A Doctrine
Which Should Be Abolished in THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 4 (Defense Re-
search Institute Monograph 1969) [hereinafter cited as Duffy]; Ghiardi, Should Punitive
Damages beAbolished?-A Statementfor the Affirmative, 1965 ABA PROCEEDINGS, SECTION
OF INS., NEGLIGENCE AND COMPENSATION LAW 282 [hereinafter cited as Ghiardi]; Long,
Punitive Damages: An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 870, 888-89 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Long]; Willis, Measure ofDamages When Property is Wrongfully Taken by a Private
Individual, 22 HARV. L. REV. 419 (1909).
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been a source of judicial discomfort, courts have continued to award
punitive damages. At present, all but five jurisdictions8 allow punitive
damages. One state, Indiana, has taken an intermediate position and
allows punitive damages only when a defendant's conduct is not pun-
ishable as a crime.9 It would.be simplistic to characterize this virtual
unanimity as mere blind adherence to an outmoded principle. Rather,
the doctrine of punitive damages survives because it continues to serve
the useful purposes of expressing society's disapproval of intolerable
conduct and deterring such conduct where no other remedy would suf-
fice. 10
At the same time, there is no dispute that the doctrine provides an
extremely powerful remedy. In many states, punitive damages cannot
be insured against." In many others, they may be levied against an
employer for the malicious acts of an employee.' 2 They almost always
are levied in excess of actual damages,' 3 without the constitutional
safeguards that attend criminal prosecution. 14 For these reasons, courts
generally agree that punitive damages "are not a favorite in law and
are to be allowed only with caution and within narrow limits .... The
allowance of such damages inherently involves an evaluation of the
nature of the conduct in question, the wisdom of some form of pecuni-
8. See Ganapolsky v. Park Gardens Dev. Corp., 439 F.2d 844 (Ist Cir. 1971) (apply-
ing Puerto Rican law); Boutte v. Hargrove, 277 So. 2d 757 (La. App. 1973); City of Lowell v.
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 257, 269-70, 47 N.E.2d 265, 272 (1943); Miller
v. Kingsley, 194 Neb. 123, 230 N.W.2d 472 (1975); Maki v. Aluminum Bldg. Prods., 73
Wash. 2d 23, 436 P.2d 186 (1968). See note 28 infra for other states which adhere to an
intermediate position in which punitive damages are limited to compensation for actual
damages.
9. See Koerner v. Oberly, 56 Ind. 284 (1877); Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 332 (1854);
Glissman v. Rutt, 372 N.E.2d 1188 (Ind. App. 1978); Nicholson v. Schramm, 164 Ind. App.
598, 330 N.E.2d 795 (1975); Moore v. Waitt, 157 Ind. App. 1, 298 N.E.2d 456 (1973). See
generally Aldridge, The Indiana Doctrine of Exemplary Damages and Double Jeopardy, 20
IND. L.J. 123 (1945).
10. See notes 58-66 & accompanying text infra.
11. See, e.g., Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962);
Brown v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. App. 1971); Padavan v. Clemente,
43 A.D.2d 729, 350 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1973). See generally Haskell, Punitive Damages.- The
Public Policy and the Insurance Policy, 58 ILL. B.J. 780 (1970); Long, Should Punitive Dam-
ages Be Insured?, 44 J. OF RISK AND INS. 1 (1977).
12. See, e.g., Bingaman v. Gordon Baking Co., 186 F. Supp. 102 (N.D. Ind. 1960);
W.E. Belcher Lumber Co. v. Harrell, 252 Ala. 392, 41 So. 2d 385 (1949); Nicholson v.
Schramm, 164 Ind. App. 598, 330 N.E.2d 785 (1975). See generally Malicious Torts, supra
note 1.
13. DOBBS, supra note 1, § 3.9, at 204.
14. See Long, supra note 7, at 885; Note, The Imposition ofPunishment by Civil Courts:
A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1158, 1180-81 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Punishment by Civil Courts].
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ary punishment, and the advisability of a deterrent."' 15 Because of the
danger of an excessive or inappropriate imposition of punitive dam-
ages, courts must supervise punitive damage awards closely to ensure
that they are imposed only when justified.' 6 Yet the standards for im-
posing and assessing punitive damages remain frustratingly vague.'
7
Appellate records are replete with evidence that judges desperately
want guidance on this issue.'
8
The purpose of this Article is to articulate guidelines for a princi-
pled approach to punitive damages. The Article first reviews the policy
debate over punitive damages and argues that reasons advanced for
abolishing the punitive damages doctrine altogether fail to account for
the strong policy considerations underlying the doctrine. Next dis-
cussed are the circumstances under which imposition of punitive dam-
ages would be appropriate. The Article concludes by proposing both a
reform in the procedures to be used in imposing punitive damages and
guidelines for assessing the amount of damages.
Policy Debate Over Punitive Damages
Historical Development
Two major theories have been advanced to explain the develop-
ment of punitive damages in the common law system.' 9 The first the-
15. Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 1970), quoted approv-
ingly in Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d 487, 491 (9th Cir. 1978); Simpson v. Weeks, 570 F.2d
240, 243 (8th Cir. 1978).
16. See notes 146-63 & accompanying text infra.
17. See Long, supra note 7, at 879-83.
18. See Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962): "The
term is too loose, vague, indefinite, and uncertain; and its meaning often varies from state to
state, court to court, and jury to jury. It is a chameleon of the law-changing its hue to the
color of the situation in which it may be used." Id. at 443 (Gewin, J., concurring). In
Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 266 Ind. 310, 362 N.E.2d 845 (1977), a concurring
judge concluded: "I doubt the efficacy of the standard enunciated by the majority for the
review of punitive damages awards, the 'first blush' rule. This rule is vague and contains no
objective standards for the evaluation of such awards in view of their purpose, the deter-
rence of tortious conduct, and the danger to be guarded against, awards motivated by vin-
dictiveness and prejudice. I believe that we should undertake to defne a standard of review of
punitive damages which imposes objective limitations upon such damages." Id. at 318, 362
N.E.2d at 849 (DeBruler, J., concurring) (emphasis added). See also Exemplary Damages,
supra note 1, at 529-30; Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, supra note 3, at 672 (lack of
ascertainable standards responsible for reluctance of courts to interfere with punitive dam-
ages awards).
19. Remarkably, the concept of multiple damages has been traced back to The Code of
Hammurabi in 2000 B.C. See Igoe, Punitive Damages: An Analytical Perspective, 14 TRIAL,
November 1978, at 48, 50. See also Robinson & Kane, Punitive Damages in the Products
Case 15 TRIAL, January 1979, at 34, 36.
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ory asserts that punitive damages grew out of the refusal of appellate
courts to grant new trials when excessive damages were awarded at
trial.20 Because juries at early common law performed both investiga-
tive and adjudicative functions,21 jurors were selected for their famili-
arity with the litigants and with the facts in dispute.22 Because
appellate courts had no established standards for measuring compensa-
tory damages, they deferred to the more knowledgeable jury.23 By the
end of the eighteenth century, common law courts had developed stan-
dards to measure compensatory damages in tort, contract, and property
cases, yet remained reluctant to disturb an excessive jury award when
the defendant's conduct had been particularly outrageous.24 To justify
this reluctance, courts developed a theory that the jury was permitted to
award an amount in excess of actual damages when the defendant's
conduct had been motivated by malice or ill will.
25
A second theory asserts that punitive damages were designed to
compensate the plaintiff for otherwise uncompensable injuries.26 Be-
cause emotional harm, pain and suffering, and other intangible harms
were not compensable, punitive damages are said to have arisen from
courts' efforts to justify damage awards in excess of actual, pecuniary
injury.27 Not until courts began to recognize intangible harm as com-
pensable did punishment and deterrence become the primary justifica-
tions for punitive damages.
28
The Attack on Punitive Damages
Some critics of punitive damages argue that both theories account-
ing for the development of the punitive damages doctrine show that it
was motivated by the desire to compensate the plaintiff fully.2 9 Be-
20. See Duffy, supra note 7, at 4-5; Ghiardi, supra note 7, at 283.
21. See Duffy, supra note 7, at 4.
22. See Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1159.
23. Id. at 1160.
24. See id.; Duffy, supra note 7, at 5.
25. Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. K.B. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763). See also Duffy, supra
note 7, at 5; Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1160.
26. See Duffy, supra note 7, at 5.
27. See id.
28. See Exemplary Damages, supra note 1, at 520; Punishment by Civil Courts, supra
note 14, at 1161. Connecticut, Michigan, and New Hampshire apparently continue to recog-
nize the compensatory nature of punitive damages and limit the award to compensation for
actual suffering. LeBlanc v. Spector, 378 F. Supp. 301 (D. Conn. 1973); Armstrong v. Dolge,
130 Conn. 516, 36 A.2d 24 (1944) (limited to expenses of litigation); Wise v. Daniel, 221
Mich. 229, 190 N.W. 746 (1922) (compensation for injured feelings); Bixby v. Dunlap, 56
N.H. 456 (1876); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1873) (compensation for injured feelings).
29. Duffy, supra note 7, at 5-6; Ghiardi, supra note 7, at 286-87.
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cause modem tort law has developed damage formulas that compen-
sate the injured for intangible as well as tangible harms, these critics
contend that "the purpose for which punitive damages were created no
longer exists. The doctrine is an anachronism and should be abol-
ished."
30
This argument fails to account for the fact that many legal doc-
trines serve purposes that differ from those for which they originally
were developed. The fourteenth amendment, for example, originally
was intended to protect newly freed slaves, 3' but recently has been used
to protect large public corporations. 32 So long as a doctrine continues
to serve a necessary policy goal, the fact that it has diverged from its
original function does not provide a basis for abolishing the doctrine.
The pertinent question is whether punitive damages continue to serve a
rational policy.
On more substantive grounds, critics of the doctrine contend that it
wrongfully attempts to have the civil law, without appropriate procedu-
ral safeguards, accomplish the purpose of the criminal laws.33 Punish-
ment, critics assert, is the purpose of the criminal system, whereas the
purpose of the civil system is to compensate the injured. 34 Punitive
damages provide the plaintiff with a windfall profit at the expense of
the defendant. Moreover, civil defendants may be compelled to testify
against their interests, can be punished on the strength of a preponder-
ance of the evidence, and also may be subject to criminal prosecution.
35
One writer argues that if the defendant's actions constitute a crimi-
nal violation, then the defendant should be criminally prosecuted, but
"[i]f the actions of the defendant do not constitute a crime, he then
simply should not suffer punishment. ' '36 The substance of this argu-
ment is that punishment is civilized only when it is accompanied by the
procedural safeguards built into the criminal system and when it is im-
30. Duffy, supra note 7, at 8. Accord, Ghiardi, supra note 7, at 286; Long, supra note 7,
at 888. It should be noted, however, that many intangible harms remain uncompensable in
the law of contracts. See Exemplary Damages, supra note 1, at 531-33 (discussing punitive
damages in contract actions).
31. See Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 577-78 (1949) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
32. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
33. Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 P. 1072 (1891); Duffy, supra
note 7, at 9; Ghiardi, spra note 7, at 287-88; Long, supra note 7, at 885; Punishment by Civil
Courts, supra note 14, at 1161-62; Malicious Torts, supra note 1, at 1298-99.
34. Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 P. 1072 (1891); Duffy, supra
note 7, at 9.
35. Ghiardi, supra note 7, at 287-88; Malicious Torts, supra note 1, at 1299.
36. Ghiardi, supra note 7, at 288.
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posed by someone knowledgeable and experienced in meting out pun-
ishment.37 Consequently, punitive damages serve no purpose not
already better served by the criminal law.
38
This argument reflects a view of the civil law which is far too nar-
row. All civil doctrines are shaped with a view toward setting and en-
forcing rules of behavior.39 The doctrine of punitive damages is one of
the legal devices used toward this end.4° In many cases of aggravated
misconduct in which the criminal system cannot or will not supply soci-
ety's sanction, an award of punitive damages is the only effective deter-
rent.4
1
Another frequently stated objection to punitive damages is that
they can subject a defendant to multiple punishment.42 Because juries
now properly can grant a plaintiff relief for intangible harms, compen-
satory damages arguably may contain an element of retribution.
43
Thus, a defendant may face the possibility of punishment on three
fronts: as an element of the compensatory remedy; as punitive dam-
ages; and as a criminal sanction.
The premise that juries doubly punish a defendant through com-
pensatory damages and punitive damages is questionable. Certainly, if
punitive damages were not allowed, a jury likely would incorporate the
element of outrage into the compensatory award. For example, one
author cites a case that was tried three times before three different ju-
ries, twice with a punitive damage instruction and once without: all
37. See id. at 287-88. But see Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L.
REv. 1173 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Morris], where the author concludes that "[a]s long as
the liability with fault rules are retained, the law of torts will have an admonitory function
even though the doctrine of punitive damages is abandoned. So punishment in tort actions
is not anomalous (if anomalous only means unusual); and punitive damage practice is only
one of many means of varying the size of money judgments in view of the admonitory
function." Id. at 1177.
38. See Ghiardi, supra note 7, at 9-10; Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at
1161-63, 1173. In Punishment by Civil Courts, the author states that the functions of criminal
law are (1) retribution, (2) general deterrence, (3) specific deterrence, (4) neutralization (if
imprisoned), and (5) rehabilitation (if imprisoned), and that punitive damages serve only the
first three of these purposes and, even then, in a manner inferior to criminal enforcement:
"No matter how mild the criminal sanction, the possibility of confinement or the stigma of a
criminal record are greater deterrents to wrongful conduct than the mere imposition of mon-
etary sanctions." Id. at 1173. But see notes 101-14 & accompanying text infra.
39. See notes 51-57 & accompanying text infra.
40. See Morris, supra note 37, at 1177.
41. See notes 66-71, 100-17 & accompanying text infra.
42. See Duffy, supra note 7, at 10; Morris, supra note 37, at 1195-98; Exemplary Dam-
ages, supra note 1, at 524-25.
43. Exemplary Damages, supra note I, at 524-25.
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three verdicts were identical.44 Under these circumstances, the wiser
course is to allow juries to be straightforward and explicitly award ad-
ditional damages for the outrageous nature of a defendant's conduct.
At the very least this facilitates appellate review and conserves judicial
resources by allowing remittitur or new trials on the punitive damages
issue alone.
To the extent that a punitive civil remedy might duplicate criminal
punishment, the likelihood of criminal punishment should be taken
into account when a judge decides whether to instruct a jury on puni-
tive damages.45 As not all outrageous conduct is criminal, however, the
argument that punitive damages would be duplicative in some cases is
not a persuasive reason for abandoning the doctrine altogether.
Finally, those who favor abolishing the doctrine of punitive dam-
ages argue that the lack of clear standards governing the amount of
punitive awards frees the jury to act irrationally, out of passion and
prejudice.46 A closely related argument is that civil juries are inexperi-
enced and ill-equipped to mete out punishment that will be in the best
interests of society.
47
Although no quantitative standards exist for measuring the
amount of punitive damages, the same can be said for measuring intan-
gible harm as a component of compensatory damages. As one author
contends: "The invocation of a pecuniary compensation standard does
not transform the inexact process of judicial inquiry into high sci-
ence.'" 48 Punitive damages, like compensatory damages, are subject to
control by the trial court and to appellate review so that the discretion
of the jury is never unfettered.49 Furthermore, flexibility in the stan-
dards for punitive damages not only is necessary, but also desirable.
The effectiveness of punitive damages would be reduced drastically if
they were not individualized to fit the financial status of the defendant
44. Id. at 521 (citing Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 36 Wis. 450 (1874) ($4,500 for exem-
plary and compensatory damages combined); 39 Wis. 636 (1876) ($4,500 compensatory); 42
Wis. 654, 671-72 (1877) ($2,500 compensatory, $2,000 exemplary)).
45. See notes 115-18, 180-82 & accompanying text infra.
46. See Duffy, supra note 7, at 10; Ghiardi, supra note 7, at 287; Long, supra note 7, at
885; Morris, supra note 37, at 1189; Morris, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 21
OHIO ST. L.J. 216, 227 (1960); Malicious Torts, supra note 1, at 1298.
47. See Morris, supra note 37, at 1179.
48. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 219 (discussing the multiple purposes of compensatory
damages in contract cases). See also Exemplary Damages, supra note 1, at 529-30.
49. See, e.g., Butts v. Curtis Publishing Co., 225 F. Supp. 916, 919 (N.D. Ga. 1964),
afl'd, 351 F.2d 702 (1965), aff'd, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 496
P.2d 682 (1972). See also DOBBS, supra note I, at 220; Punishment by Civil Courts, supra
note 14, at 1171-72.
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and the reprehensibility of his or her conduct.50
Although the foregoing objections to the doctrine of punitive dam-
ages command attention and respect, they do not dictate the abolition
of the doctrine. Rather, they merely present negative features that
must be balanced against the doctrine's positive goals.
Justifications for Imposing Punitive Damages
Stated in broad terms, the function performed by the doctrine of
punitive damages is to aid courts in enforcing established norms of
conduct.5' All law, whether civil or criminal, reflects society's norms
and goals. The criminal system enforces these rules to some extent by
punishing those who violate criminal statutes, thereby deterring the de-
fendant-and others-from similar conduct.5 2 The criminal system
does not, however, have a monopoly on this task.
Whenever a civil court resolves the conflicting claims of two pri-
vate parties, it also sets and enforces standards of behavior.5 3 For this
reason, in addition to achieving a result that does justice between the
parties, a court also must achieve a result that protects the interest of
society. That the civil law operates to prod behavior toward certain
goals is demonstrated by the fact that liability for both torts54 and con-
tracts is premised upon failure to conform to expected standards of be-
havior. Professor Morris states that "while our joint interest in the
economic stability of the individuals who make up society supplies a
sufficient reason for giving money toplaintiffs, it suggests no reason for
taking moneyfrom defendants'."55 In his apt terms, civil law has both
"reparative" and "admonitory" functions.56 The doctrine of punitive
damages concerns itself with the latter function;57 it enhances the civil
law's admonition to wrongdoers in several important ways.
50. See notes 175, 178 & accompanying text infra.
51. See Lampert v. Reynolds Metals Co., 372 F.2d 245, 247 (9th Cir. 1967); Brown v.
Coates, 253 F.2d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Acheson v. Shefter, 107 Ariz. 576, 578, 490 P.2d
832, 834 (1971); Eshelman v. Rawalt, 298 11. 192, 197, 131 N.E. 675, 677 (1921). Seealso W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 14-16 (4th ed. 1971).
52. See Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1161-62.
53. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 18 (4th ed. 1971).
54. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 217; Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 1, at 523.
55. Morris, supra note 37, at 1173 (emphasis in original).
56. Id. at 1173-76. Professor Morris uses the term "reparative" to mean providing
money substitutes for losses. Id. at 1173. "Admonitory" refers to discouraging repetition of
wrongful conduct and warning others who are inclined to engage in similar conduct. Id. at
1174.
57. Id. at 1176.
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Expressing Society's Disapproval of Outrageous Conduct and Deterring Such
Conduct in the Future
An award of compensatory damages may be sufficient when injury
has resulted from well-intentioned, but poorly-advised behavior.58
When the defendant's conduct can be characterized as malicious, op-
pressive, or otherwise outrageous, a stronger sanction is needed. The
imposition of punitive damages effectively expresses to the defendant
that such conduct will not be tolerated.
This expression of disapproval by extracting money from the de-
fendant for his or her misconduct may fairly be characterized as pun-
ishment.5 9 If the doctrine of punitive damages were based solely on
vindictiveness, however, it surely would be unsupportable. Although
vindictiveness is a common human emotion, vindictive behavior is par-
ticularly irrational in that it seeks to inflict present suffering to "rem-
edy" past injuries that cannot be undone. Inflicting punishment for
past acts, however, tends also to control future behavior, in that the
defendant and others in a similar position will wish to avoid the un-
pleasant consequences of such acts in the future.60 Punishment, there-
fore, cannot be separated from deterrence.
This deterrent effect aids a civil court in enforcing social norms,
6 1
and consequently is especially vital where the defendant would have
little else to lose by committing the wrong. Two cases demonstrate this
58. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Executive Estates, Inc., 369 N.E.2d
1117, 1130-31 (Ind. App. 1978) (an award of punitive damages for mere negligence is im-
proper; conduct supporting such an award must be of a more reprehensible character).
59. For discussion of the punitive element, see Long, supra note 7, at 876-77; Exemplary
Damages, supra note 1, at 523-24; Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1161-63.
60. See Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1978); Lampert v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
372 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1967); Morgan v. Bates, 390 P.2d 486 (Okla. 1964). See also Sostre v.
McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. deniedsub nom. Sostre v. Oswald, 404 U.S.
1049 (1972); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 23 (4th ed. 1971); Morris,
supra note 37, at 1181; Malicious Torts, supra note 1, at 1298.
61. See, e.g., Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 1970);
Jones v. Abriani, 350 N.E.2d 635, 650 (Ind. App. 1976); McCarthy v. J.P. Cullen & Son
Corp., 199 N.W.2d 362, 368 (Iowa 1972). See also Riley, Punitive Damages: The Doctrine of
Just Enrichment, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 195, 203 (1977-78) [hereinafter cited as Riley]. But see
Duffy, supra note 7, at 11; Ghiardi, supra note 7, at 288. Both Duffy and Ghiardi contend
that the deterrent function of punitive damages is fictional, because the incidence of outra-
geous conduct is no higher in the states that disallow punitive damages than in the states that
allow them. This conclusion is unfounded, as the figures do not show what the incidence of
outrageous conduct would have been in the 46 states that allow punitive damages but/or the
doctrine. Melvin Belli states that "[a]sking whether punitive damages actually do deter mis-
conduct is like asking whether the death penalty deters murder." Belli, Punitive Damages.:
An Historical Perspective, 13 TRIAL, December 1977, at 40, 44.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
point. In Harris v. Wagshal,62 the defendants perpetrated numerous
frauds on their judgment creditor to hinder the creditor's attempts to
satisfy a judgment. Absent the imposition of punitive damages, the de-
fendants had little to lose by their acts; the compensatory relief avail-
able would only have forced them to relinquish the property to the
rightful owners. The imposition of punitive damages, however, re-
moved the incentive for committing fraud.63 This rationale also applies
in cases in which the defendant has determined that he or she will reap
greater profits by engaging in wrongful conduct and running the risk of
later paying compensation for such conduct. For example, in Funk v.
Kerbaugh,64 the defendant decided that it would be "cheaper to pay
damages" 65 for carrying out blasting in a manner which destroyed the
plaintiff's building than to alter the blasting method. When the possi-
bility of a punitive damage award of an uncertain amount enters a de-
fendant's decisionmaking process, the financial temptation to engage in
wrongful conduct becomes more resistable. 66
Providing Incentives for Private Civil Enforcement
All serious misdeeds cannot possibly be punished by government
prosecution. For one thing, not all misconduct is punishable as a crime
or a civil violation; for another, limited judicial and prosecutorial re-
sources permit prosecution for only a fraction of the crimes and viola-
tions committed. For these reasons, individual members of society
must play a significant role in instituting actions to impose sanctions
for serious misconduct. Society's interest in bringing a wrongdoer to
justice is especially strong where the wrongdoer's conduct exceeds all
bounds of decency.
The doctrine of punitive damages promotes this interest. 67 By of-
fering the potential for recovery in excess of actual damages, the doc-
62. 343 A.2d 283 (D.C. App. 1975).
63. Id. at 288 n.13. Although the creditor claimed no compensatory damages resulting
from the fraud, the court found the award of punitive damages nonetheless proper, stating:
"Since the purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter intolerable conduct, we do
not find it inappropriate to assess damages in a case such as this in proportion to the sum
hoped to be gained by the fraud." Id.
64. 222 Pa. 18, 70 A. 953 (1908).
65. Id. at 19, 70 A. at 954.
66. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr.
482 (1979) (punitive damages operate as attempt to restore balance in contractual relation-
ships); Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 923, 582 P.2d 980, 987, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389,
396 (1978) (refusal to accept settlement offer motivated by desire to use family's unfortunate
circumstances as lever to force settlement more favorable to company).
67. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 205.
January 1980]
trine encourages plaintiffs to bring such actions.68 This is particularly
important where actual damages are minimal.69 Absent the possibility
of obtaining punitive damages, it would be economically unfeasible in
such cases for a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit and unlikely that the de-
fendant would be deterred from similar action in the future. Punitive
damages thus can be characterized as a reward for the plaintiffs valua-
ble role as a "private attorney general." 70 Even where compensatory
damages are substantial, an award of punitive damages helps to finance
deserving claims by defraying the expenses of the action, such as attor-
neys' fees, that generally are not recoverable in American courts. 71 Fi-
nally, by ensuring that a plaintiff can pursue a private punitive remedy,
with the potential for financial gain at the expense of the wrongdoer,
the doctrine of punitive damages encourages plaintiffs to prefer legal
action over violent self-help.72 Although revenge is not a civilized basis
for imposing punitive damages, the prevention of private vengeance
clearly is.73
Although the policy debate over the doctrine of punitive damages
demonstrates that the doctrine is potentially dangerous and unfair
when applied without regard to its underlying principles, the doctrine is
an undeniably powerful tool in controlling antisocial conduct. The
question then becomes, when is such a powerful remedy appropriate?
What Conduct Should Give Rise to Punitive Damages?
One author has noted that punitive damages have been imposed as
a result of "an astounding range of conduct from 'oppression, fraud, or
malice' on the one extreme to 'rudeness' or 'mere caprice' on the
other."' 74 To some extent, providing considerable judicial discretion is
unavoidable-even desirable-when one considers that a court's deci-
sion to impose punitive damages reflects a value judgment about
whether a defendant's misconduct has been serious enough to warrant
an extra measure of deterrence. Nevertheless, merely to state that pu-
68. See Kink v. Combs, 28 Wis. 2d 65, 80, 135 N.W.2d 789, 798 (1965); DOBBs, supra
note 1, at 205; Long, supra note 7, at 878; Morris, supra note 37, at 1183-88.
69. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 205; Long, supra note 7, at 878; Exemplary Damages, supra
note 1, at 525-26.
70. For discussion of the enforcement aspect of a plaintiffs role, see Walker v. Sheldon,
10 N.Y.2d 401,404, 179 N.E.2d 497, 498, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488, 490 (1961); DOBBS, supra note 1,
at 205; Morris, supra note 37, at 1183-88; Exemplary Damages, supra note 1, at 525-26.
71. See Exemplary Damages, supra note 1, at 521.
72. Id. at 521-22; Morris, supra note 37, at 1198-99.
73. See Exemplary Damages, supra note 1, at 521-22.
74. Long, supra note 7, at 881.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31
nitive damages will be imposed in cases involving malice, oppression,
and the like may obscure the principles underlying the doctrine rather
than enforce them. More specific guidance is necessary to promote
principled imposition of punitive damages. One major factor is
whether any other existing remedy performs the functions for which
the doctrine was designed. This, in turn, depends on the conduct in-
volved.
Tortious Conduct
Although tort law has been the traditional arena for punitive dam-
age awards, not every tort gives rise to punitive damages. 75 Simple
negligence, for example, is not a sufficient basis for imposing punitive
damages. 76 Courts rightfully have regarded the availability of compen-
satory damages as a sufficient deterrent to negligence, if indeed negli-
gence can be deterred at all.77 More to the point, however, is the notion
that negligent conduct is not culpable enough to justify the stem sanc-
tion of civil punishment.78 The simple fact that negligent acts are com-
mitted regularly is significant; an extraordinary sanction should not be
imposed on ordinary conduct. Rather, the sanction of punitive dam-
ages is, and should be, reserved for conduct that exceeds the bounds of
normal fumbling. The defendant's state of mind is what transforms
conduct from the understandable to the intolerable.79 When the de-
fendant actively has desired to bring about harm to another, or when
he or she has callously threatened harm to the rights of others, that
conduct is not merely unreasonable, it is abhorrent.
The closer a defendant's state of mind comes to a subjective per-
ception of the risk of harm to another, the more likely it becomes that
punitive damages will be awarded.80 Accordingly, simple negligence is
not subject to punitive damages, but conduct variously termed "gross
negligence," "willful and wanton misconduct," or "reckless disregard
for the safety of others" frequently iS.81 Although there has been some
75. See Riley, supra note 61, at 225 (commission of tort in malicious manner tradi-
tional basis for punitive damage assessment).
76. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Executive Estates, Inc., 369 N.E.2d
1117, 1130-31 (ind. App. 1978).
77. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 10 (4th ed. 1971);
Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1164-65.
78. See Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1165.
79. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 11 (4th ed. 1971): "lit
is not so much the particular tort committed as the defendant's motives and conduct in
committing it which will be important as the basis of the award."
80. See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 205-06.
81. See, e.g., Brooks v. Wootton, 355 F.2d 177, 178 (2d Cir. 1966); Alabama Elec.
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disagreement over the meaning of these terms, 82 to the extent that they
indicate that the defendant had or should have had a subjective percep-
tion of the risks involved, punitive damages are properly awarded.
83
An example of this type of conduct is supplied by Claunch v. Bennett,
84
in which the defendant engaged a friend in a drag race on a busy city
street, at speeds upwards of ninety miles per hour. A collision ensued,
resulting in the plaintiff's injuries. Although there was no showing that
the defendant driver consciously had desired to cause harm to others,
the risk he was creating was so great and so obvious that proceeding in
the face of it could only be characterized as callous indifference. Ac-
cordingly, to warrant punitive damages conduct must be reckless, not
merely derelict.
In many cases, a defendant's attitude of callousness toward poten-
tial harm constitutes a greater threat to society, and hence increases the
need for deterrence, than the isolated occurrence of the speed contest in
Claunch; for instance, where the defendant proceeds in the face of a
known risk to a large number of people. For example, in Toole v. Rich-
ardson-Merrell Inc. ,85 a leading manufacturer of pharmaceuticals mar-
keted a drug known as MER/29, which purported to aid treatment of
arteriosclerosis by inhibiting the production of cholesterol in blood.
Although the company's own experiments showed abnormal blood
changes and eye opacities in animals, the defendant repeatedly covered
up reports of these experiments, fictionalized data, and misrepresented
facts to both the medical profession and the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA). When MER/29 was approved by the FDA, its release
was accompanied by the greatest marketing push ever conducted by the
company. Despite the fact that harmful side effects in humans were
soon reported, the company continued to deny that the drug was dan-
gerous and bitterly fought the FDA's recall of the drug. The tragic
result of the defendant's callousness was that over 5,000 people were
injured, among them the plaintiff, who suffered cataracts in both eyes.
Coop., Inc. v. Partridge, 283 Ala. 251, 215 So. 2d 580 (1968); Soucy v. Greyhound Corp., 27
App. Div. 2d 112, 276 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1967); Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Brown, 477 P.2d 67, 70-71
(Okla. 1970); Jones v. Hernandez, 148 Ind. App. 17, 263 N.E.2d 759 (1970). See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 501, Comment (b) (1965).
82. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 10 (4th ed. 1971);
Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1164-65.
83. See Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1165.
84. 395 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App. 1965).
85. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967). See generally Rheingold, The
MER/29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 116
(1968).
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The California Court of Appeal affirmed the $250,00086 punitive dam-
ages award, stating that there was ample evidence in the record that the
defendant had acted recklessly and in wanton disregard of possible
harm to others by marketing and promoting MER/29 despite knowl-
edge of the drug's toxic side effects.
87
Although the punitive damages awarded in Toole were paltry in
comparison to the $7,000,000 the company grossed from the sale of
MER/29 during its first year of sales, 88 the award of any punitive dam-
ages acted as a warning to the defendant and others who might be
tempted to engage in similar conduct. That warning stated that society
will not tolerate calculated misconduct that risks human suffering. Im-
posing damages in excess of actual harm greatly increases the costs and
uncertainty surrounding reckless misbehavior and makes wrongful
conduct less tempting.8 9
Courts frequently cite oppression as being a ground for the impo-
sition of punitive damages. 90 Oppression carries with it an attitudinal
element, for it implies knowledge of power over a weaker party and use
of that power as leverage to gain one's own ends. A recent example of
this type of case is Zarcone v. Perry,91 in which punitive damages were
awarded against a judge. The plaintiff in Zarcone operated a food
86. The original jury award of $500,000 punitive damages subsequently was reduced
by consent to $250,000. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 694, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 398, 403 (1967).
87. Id. at 713-15, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 415-16. But see Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967), another MER/29 case in which the plaintiff's injuries arose
out of the same course of conduct. The court in Roginsky concluded that there was insuffi-
cient proof of managerial complicity to justify punitive damages and that, in view of the
multiple litigation, the imposition of punitive damages could punish the defendants too se-
verely and "strip the cupboard bare" for other plaintiffs. See notes 183-92 & accompanying
text infra. For a discussion of the punitive damages issue in the MER/29 cases see Rhein-
gold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 116,
134-37 (1968).
88. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 701, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 408
(1967).
89. The jury in a California product liability case involving the Ford Pinto based its
punitive damage award of $125 million on a disgorgement of profits theory. The jury alleg-
edly felt that since Ford had saved $100 million by marketing the unsafe fuel tanks, only an
amount in excess of that figure would properly penalize the defendant. See The Wall Street
Journal, Feb. 14, 1978, at 1, col. 4. The trial judge subsequently reduced the punitive dam-
ages award to $3.5 million, holding the jury award excessive as a matter of law. Grimshaw
v. Ford Motor Co., No. 197761-199397 (Cal. Super. Ct., Orange County Feb. 14, 1978),
reported in 22 JURY VERDICTS WEEKLY, No. 14, at 26 (1978). The case presently is on
appeal to the California Court of Appeal. Id. See note 176 & accompanying text infra.
90. See, e.g., Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897); Roberts v. Pierce, 398 F.2d 954 (5th
Cir. 1968); Morgan v. Bates, 390 P.2d 486 (Okla. 1964).
91. 572 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1978).
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vending truck in front of a courthouse. During a night court session,
the defendant judge asked a deputy to bring some coffee to the court-
room. The judge tasted the coffee, found it to be "putrid," and ordered
the deputy to bring the vendor before him "in cuffs."'92 The deputy
then manacled the vendor and marched him to the judge's chambers in
view of dozens of people. The judge conducted a pseudo-official inqui-
sition in which he loudly berated the vendor for 20 minutes, threaten-
ing him and his livelihood. The vendor then was allowed to leave, but
upon returning to the courthouse area after resuming his normal route
he was again called to the judge's chambers and verbally abused. The
vendor brought suit, alleging he had suffered emotional distress from
this incident which required hospitalization and prevented him from
working. Although the vendor was awarded $80,000 in compensatory
damages, the defendant's contention on appeal that the size of the com-
pensatory award precluded a punitive damages award was rebuffed by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals:
[T]here is no merit to appellant's converse claim that a large compen-
satory award in a civil rights action precludes a substantial punitive
award. The purpose of the former is to make a plaintiff whole for his
injuries; the main purpose of the latter is to deter defendants and
others from similar conduct in the future.
93
The conduct of the judge in Zarcone is shocking for the very reason
that the judge, knowing he possessed the power of the state, used that
power for personal vindictiveness. The imposition of punitive damages
can be invaluable in cases of oppression, whether the oppression be
governmental or economic. Because of the disparity of power between
the parties, the stronger party has little else to fear.
94
Accordingly, in instances of tortious conduct punitive damages are
properly imposed when the defendant's misconduct exceeds the bounds
of behavior with which most people can identify. Whether the miscon-
duct is termed malicious, reckless, fraudulent, or oppressive, the de-
92. Id. at 53.
93. Id. at 55 n.6.
94. It should be noted that the defendant in Zarcone was removed from the bench for
his treatment of the plaintiff. Id. at 54. The court stated that the judge's removal did not
militate against the imposition of punitive damages, since "punitive damages are meant to
deter others as well as the particular defendant." Id. at 56. Thus, the court treated the
judge's removal as special deterrence only. It seems likely, however, that the potential for
removal is as effective, if not more effective, than punitive damages as a warning to future
judges. For that reason, while the facts of the Zarcone case are squarely within the type of
conduct for which punitive damages should be imposed, the decision arguably is unprinci-
pled because of the presence of another effective deterrent. The only saving argument is that
the punitive damages award in Zarcone serves as a lesson to nonjudicial oppressors, who
may not be subject to removal from office.
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fendant must or should have had a perception of the possibility of
harm to others. This would include cases in which the defendant may
deny the conscious wish to do harm, but in which the risk of harm
created is so obvious that simply continuing in the face of that risk can
be characterized as callousness. 95 Such conduct implies a flouting of
social norms, not just an accidental violation, and calls for a sanction
more severe than mere compensatory damages. Moreover, when the
misconduct is not a violation of criminal statutes, the imposition of
punishment by a civil court is likely to be the only effective way of
admonishing the defendant.
Conduct Punishable as a Crime
The policy attack on punitive damages is most persuasive when
the conduct for which punitive damages are imposed is also punishable
as a crime. If a defendant has violated a criminal statute, he or she
stands to lose liberty or property in addition to suffering the stigma of
criminal conviction. The argument against the imposition of punitive
damages in such cases is that society's interest in punishing the wrong-
doer is served adequately by the criminal system, and the imposition of
punitive damages would work an unjustifiable double punishment.
96
Although the argument does not support the general abandonment of
punitive damages, nor even the abandonment of the doctrine in all
cases involving criminal conduct, it does have merit in those cases in
which the criminal system is adequately performing the functions of
punishment and deterrence.
One state, Indiana, has adopted the rule that punitive damages
will not lie in a civil case based on conduct that is punishable as a
crime.97 Although the rule apparently grew out of the erroneous view
that the imposition of punitive damages would violate the constitu-
95. See, e.g., Jones v. Hemandez, 148 Ind. App. 17, 263 N.E.2d 759 (1970).
96. See Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1177-84.
97. See Koerner v. Oberly, 56 Ind. 284 (1877); Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322 (1854);
Glissman v. Rutt, 372 N.E.2d 1188 (Ind. App. 1978); Nicholson v. Schramm, 164 Ind. App.
598, 330 N.E.2d 785 (1975); Moore v. Waitt, 157 Ind. App. 1, 298 N.E.2d 456 (1973). See
also Aldridge, The Indiana Doctrine of Exemplary Damages and Double Jeopardy, 20 IND.
L.J. 123 (1945); Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, supra note 3, at 673-77. Many states
have explicitly approved the imposition of punitive damages where the defendant also may
be punished criminally. See, e.g., Guengerich v. Smith, 36 Iowa 587 (1873); Colbert v. Jour-
nal Publishing Co., 19 N.M. 156, 142 P. 146 (1914). Three states hold that evidence of a
prior criminal conviction and penalty is appropriately received as evidence bearing on miti-
gation of punitive damages. See Saunders v. Gilbert, 156 N.C. 463, 72 S.E. 610 (1911);
Wirsing v. Smith, 222 Pa. 8, 70 A. 906 (1908); Jackson v. Wells, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 275, 35
S.W. 528 (1896).
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tional ban on double jeopardy,98 it is now based on the spirit of the law
regarding multiple punishment for the same offense.99 The position of
the Indiana courts is attractive because it purports to use punitive dam-
ages only when no other effective deterrent exists. To the extent that
such a rule would disallow punitive damages when the conduct is
merely punishable as a crime,'00 however, it falls short of a principled
approach. Many types of conduct are technical violations of the crimi-
nal law, but in fact rarely are prosecuted.' 0 ' Examples of this include
libel and slander, trespass, and technical batteries. ' 0 2 In such cases, pu-
nitive damages act as a substitute for the cririinal system rather than a
duplication. 103
Many other crimes, notably those involving unlawful commercial
behavior, depend on the threat of civil punishment for effective en-
forcement despite substantial government prosecution. The raft of
state 0 4 and federal statutes 10 5 that provide for multiple civil damages
in addition to criminal penalties bears witness to this fact. The treble
98. Koerner v. Oberly, 56 Ind. 284 (1877) (explicitly so stating). The rule, however,
clearly is not mandated by the United States Constitution. Rex Trailer Co. v. United States,
350 U.S. 148 (1956); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); Herald Co. v. Harper, 293 F.
Supp. 1101 (E. D. Mo. 1968), a fd, 410 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1969); Hauser v. Griffith, 102 Iowa
215, 71 N.W. 223 (1897). Cf. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir.
1967) (dealing with problem of imposing punitive damages when multiple suits may be
brought).
99. See State v. Schoonover, 135 Ind. 526, 35 N.E. 119 (1893); Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind.
322 (1854).
100. The rule in Indiana appears to apply whenever the defendant might be prosecuted.
Koerner v. Oberly, 56 Ind. 284 (1877); Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322 (1854); Nicholson v.
Schramm, 164 Ind. App. 598, 330 N.E.2d 785 (1975); Moore v. Waitt, 157 Ind. App. 1, 298
N.E.2d 456 (1973). The possibility that the rule prohibits punitive damages only where the
defendant has been convicted of a crime was raised in Glissman v. Rutt, 372 N.E.2d 1188
(Ind. App. 1978), but not definitely answered as the court concluded that the facts of the case
made it unnecessary to determine whether the mere possibility of criminal prosecution is
sufficient to bar the award of punitive damages. Id. at 1191 n.2.
101. See Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1175-76.
102. Id. at 1175.
103. See id. at 1175-76.
104. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 24-1-2-7 (1976) (persons injured by combinations to restrain
trade or prevent competition may recover treble damages).
105. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) (treble damages for private person injured by viola-
tion of antitrust laws); 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1976) (treble damages for private person injured by
unfair competition in importing trade); 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1976) (authorizes punitive dam-
ages in an unlimited amount for person injured by wire interception); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(Supp. 1 1977) (discretionary award of up to two times actual damages for violation of mini-
mum wage and overtime pay provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act); 42 U.S.C. § 3612(b),




damage provision of the federal antitrust laws,106 for example, can be"
considered a thinly-veiled type of punitive damages.'0 7 In view of the
limited resources of the Department of Justice, treble damages are a
more effective deterrent than the possibility of criminal prosecution.
0 8
It would be naive to suppose-even where conduct is of a type that
is frequently prosecuted-that the criminal system will always fulfill its
function. 10 9 Practices such as plea bargaining, suspending sentences,
and granting pardons, immunity, and parole, water down the deterrent
effect of the criminal law. Furthermore, maximum criminal penalties,
to ensure due process, must be established in advance by the legisla-
ture. Punitive damages, on the other hand, can be individualized to
provide a deterrent that will be adequate for each case.10
Although in a criminal case a trial judge may be flexible in sen-
tencing, in some situations the maximum applicable penalty is small in
relation to the reprehensibility of the conduct and the defendant's abil-
ity to pay. This is often true where the defendant is a corporation, not
subject to loss of liberty."' For example, Ford Motor Company re-
cently was indicted in Indiana on three counts of reckless homicide
stemming from its defective design of fuel tanks on the Pinto, which
allegedly caused the death of three young girls." 2 If convicted on all
three counts, Ford could lose $35,000 in fines.' 13 In a recent civil suit in
California brought against Ford by a young man who was injured
under similar circumstances, the punitive damages award, even as re-
106. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) provides that: "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor...
and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee."
107. Acme Precision Prods., Inc. v. American Alloys Corp., 347 F. Supp. 376,380 (W.D.
Mo. 1972), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 422 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1970) (dictum).
108. See generally Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 167 (1958). But cf. Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Eff-
ciency: The Uneasy Casefor Treble Damages, 17 J.L. & ECON. 329 (1974) (suggesting that a
public sector approach to enforcement would be a preferable alternative to private enforce-
ment).
109. See Morris, supra note 37, at 1196: "It is a notoriously good guess that current
administration of the criminal law is not particularly efficient."
110. See id.
111. For example, Richardson-Merrell, Inc., Win. S. Merrell Co., and three of its scien-
tists were indicted under the federal false writing statute (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1001
(1976)) for their activities with regard to MER/29. All defendants pleaded nolo contendere.
"The corporate defendants were fined a total of $80,000, the maximum penalty, and the
three scientists received suspended sentences." Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance
of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 116, 120-21 (1968).
112. Louisville Courier-Journal, Sept. 15, 1978, § b, at 3, col. 1.
113. Id.
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duced by the judge, totalled $3.5 million. 14 Can there be any doubt as
to which penalty will be the more effective deterrent?
Because the criminal system cannot always adequately fulfill its
role as an enforcer of society's rules, punitive damages should not be
eliminated on the ground that the defendant's conduct may be pun-
ished as a crime. By the same token, punitive damages should not be
imposed in instances in which the criminal system is fulfilling its func-
tion. If the criminal system does provide adequate punishment and
deterrence, the imposition of punitive damages would be duplicative
and thus unprincipled." 15 Punitive damages should be used in civil
cases involving criminal misconduct only when they are needed as a
substitute for, or as a supplement to, criminal sanctions.
What is needed in such cases is not a wholesale ban on punitive
damages, but rather a system of getting more information to the trial
judge.1 6 The judge should have access to information concerning
criminal prosecutions of the defendant to make an informed decision
about the propriety of a punitive damages instruction." 7 If prosecution
has been instituted for an offense that carries a serious penalty, the
judge properly could decline the instruction." 8 If, however, criminal
prosecution has not been instituted against the defendant, or if prosecu-
tion has been instituted but the maximum penalty is unduly slight in
relation to the seriousness of the defendant's conduct and ability to pay,
punitive damages may be appropriate.
Oppressive Conduct in Contractual Relationships
Although courts frequently state that punitive damages are not re-
coverable in contract actions," 19 this rule always has had important ex-
114. The jury originally had awarded $125 million in punitive damages. The judge re-
duced this award to $3.5 million, holding the larger figure excessive as a matter of law. See
note 89 supra.
115. See Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1181-84.
116. Id. at 1175.
117. See notes 180-82 & accompanying text infra.
118. See Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1174, 1181-82 (suggesting that
where such prosecution is ikely, punitive damages would be inappropriate). However, bas-
ing the imposition of punitive damages on the likelihood of criminal prosecution would be
unworkable. There are bound to be cases where prosecution seemed likely at the time of the
civil trial but never was instituted. In cases such as these that involve serious misconduct no
deterrent at all would be available. In cases where a defendant is not prosecuted until after
the civil trial, the criminal trial judge should be able to take the punitive damages award into
consideration in a sentencing decision. See Morris, supra note 37, at 1197.
119. See, e.g., Young v. Main, 72 F.2d 640, 643 (8th Cir. 1934); Hibschman Pontiac, Inc.
v. Batchelor, 266 Ind. App. 310, 314, 340 N.E.2d 377, 379 (1976); Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes,
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ceptions.' 20 Punitive damages long have been imposed in contract
cases that have a decidedly tortious flavor, such as those involving
breach of contract to marry, breach of contract by public utility compa-
nies, and breach of fiduciary duty.' 2' In addition, one of the most im-
portant exceptions to the rule is that punitive damages may be imposed
if the breach of contract constitutes some independent tort.' 22 Recent
cases in the insurance area demonstrate that this exception threatens to
swallow the rule, because of the willingness of courts to recognize bad
faith breach of contract as a new tort in itself.
The famous California case of Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co. '
23
established that a duty of good faith is implied in every insurance con-
tract and that the breach of that duty sounds in both tort and con-
tract.' 24 Under more recent California law, an insurer who erroneously
denies coverage under a policy will be liable for compensatory dam-
ages, including damages for emotional distress, even where its denial
was not entirely groundless. 25 More is required, however, to subject
the insurer to punitive damages. 26 A recent case illustrates what that
"something extra" is that merits civil punishment.
In Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange 27 an insured motorist was
seriously injured in an automobile collision with an uninsured motor-
ist. The injured party's insurance coverage provided uninsured motor-
ist benefits and a medical payment provision. Although the defendant
insurance company paid the benefits due under the medical payment
provision, it asserted various defenses to the requirement that it pay
uninsured motorist benefits. Arbitration proceedings were instituted
and defendant was found liable for the benefits. The injured motorist
575 S.W.2d 480, 486 (Ky. App. 1978); White v. Benkowski, 37 Wis. 2d 285, 290-92, 155
N.W.2d 74, 77 (1967).
120. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 220-40.
121. See id. at 220-29; Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, supra note 3, at 677-78.
122. See, e.g., Country Club Corp. v. McDaniel, 310 So. 2d 436,437 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975); Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 266 Ind. App. 310, 314, 340 N.E.2d 377, 380
(1976); Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480, 486 (Ky. App. 1978) (dictum).
123. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
124. Id. at 573, 510 P.2d at 1036-37, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 484-85. A substantial amount of
California case law supported this decision. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425,
426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d
654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
125. See Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 15,
538 P.2d 744, 748, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288, 292 (1975).
126. See Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr.
711 (1974).
127. 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1978).
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then instituted a court action 28 seeking compensatory and punitive
damages for bad faith failure to pay the benefits prior to arbitration.
The award of compensatory and punitive damages totaling
$749,011.48129 was affirmed by the California Supreme Court.
In addressing the issue of punitive damages, the court, although
noting that breach of the duty of good faith had been shown, concluded
"such a determination does not in itself establish that defendant acted
with the quality of intent that is requisite to an award of punitive dam-
ages. For this we must look further-beyond the matter of reasonable
response to that of motive and intent." 130 The court concluded that this
extra showing was met by evidence that defendant "acted maliciously,
with an intent to oppress, and in conscious disregard of the rights of its
insured."' 131 The court considered the defendant's conduct to be "part
of a conscious course of conduct, designed to utilize the lamentable
circumstances in which. . . [the insured and her family] found them-
selves, and the exigent financial situation resulting from it, as a lever to
force a settlement more favorable to the company than the facts would
otherwise have warranted." 132 This conduct was the "something extra"
on which the court hinged the award of punitive damages.
133
The California cases allowing punitive damages against insurance
companies have done so by classifying the bad faith breach of contract
as a tort. 134 This approach has been necessitated by a California statute
that allows punitive damages only for "the breach of an obligation not
arising from contract."' 135 Other states, unhampered by such a statute,
appear to be breaking with the traditional rule of disallowing punitive
128. Subsequent to the filing of the complaint the plaintiff motorist died of other causes
and was succeeded by her administrator. Id. at 917, 582 P.2d at 983, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
129. The jury originally had awarded $1,528,211.35, but this amount was reduced by
plaintiffs remittitur in response to a conditional order granting defendant's motion for a
new trial. Id. at 920, 582 P.2d at 985, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
130. Id. at 922, 582 P.2d at 986, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
131. Id. at 923, 582 P.2d at 986-87, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
132. Id. at 923, 582 P.2d at 987, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
133. Accord, Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 822, 598 P.2d 452, 157
Cal. Rptr. 482 (1979) (citing Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148
Cal. Rptr. 389 (1978)) (concluding evidence supported finding that defendant "'acted mali-
ciously, with an intent to oppress, and in conscious disregard of the rights of its insured'"
but finding punitive damages award of $5 million excessive as a matter of law).
134. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 241; Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, supra note
3, at 680.
135. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970) provides: "In an action for the breach of an
obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression,
fraud, or malice, express or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may
recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant."
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damages in contract cases and have imposed punitive damages in cases
involving malicious, oppressive, or like conduct, despite the existence
of a contract. 136 Significantly, this trend is not limited to cases involv-
ing insurance companies.
Jones v. Abriani137 exemplifies this more modem approach of
other states. In Jones, the plaintiffs were a young married couple who
had ordered a new mobile home from the defendants. When the mo-
bile home arrived, the plaintiffs found that it differed from the home
they had ordered and was defective in several important respects. They
immediately attempted to reject the delivery but were threatened with
forfeiture of their down payment by the sellers, who assured the plain-
tiffs that the defects would be cured. The sellers also failed to disclose
the terms of the limited warranty on the mobile home until the war-
ranty had expired. Most of the defects were never repaired despite the
seller's continuous assurances, and additional problems with the home
arose.
Approving the jury's award of $3,000 in punitive damages, the In-
diana Court of Appeals noted that while the wrong committed was a
serious one and tortious in nature, it did not fit conveniently into the
framework of a recognized tort. 38 Rather than demanding proof of
conduct that would constitute some independent tort, the court asked
whether public policy would be served by the imposition of punitive
damages.
The case at bar is a particularly appropriate instance where the
public interest is served by the punishment that is inflicted on the
wrongdoer. The damages awarded will tend to deter similar conduct
in the future against both this buyer and other members of the public
who deal with the seller .... In fact, it is hard to imagine where the
public interest to be served is more important than in consumer mat-
ters, especially where the consumer is in an inferior bargaining posi-
tion and forced to either sign an adhesion contract or do without the
item desired.13
9
The adoption of this public policy approach, which imposes punitive
136. See, e.g., Whitfield Constr. Co. v. Commercial Dev. Corp., 392 F. Supp. 982 (D.V.I.
1975); Jones v. Abriani, 350 N.E.2d 635 (Ind. App. 1976); Lou Leventhal Auto Co. v.
Munns, 164 Ind. App. 368, 328 N.E.2d 734 (1975); Rex Ins. Co. v. Baldwin, 323 N.E.2d 270
(Ind. App. 1975); Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 161 Ind. App. 413, 316 N.E.2d 381
(1974), modfledon other grounds, 264 Ind. 599,349 N.E.2d 173 (1976); Eakman v. Robb, 237
N.W.2d 423 (N.D. 1975). See also Sullivan, supra note 3, at 245.
137. 350 N.E.2d 635 (Ind. App. 1976).
138. Id. at 650 (quoting Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599, 608, 349
N.E.2d 173, 180 (1976)).
139. 350 N.E.2d at 650. Cf Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599, 608, 349
N.E.2d 173, 180 (1976) ("serious wrong, tortious in nature," even if not "conveniently
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damages for serious misconduct even if arising under contract, is com-
mendable. The imposition of punitive damages should not depend on
so fine a point as whether a case sounds in tort or in contract, as distinc-
tions between tort and contract actions frequently are difficult to main-
tain. 140 Further, punitive damages may be even more important in a
contract action than in a tort action, because of the limitations of con-
tract damages. If wrongdoers only have to fear a measure of damages
that would force them to do what was required originally, there is little
disincentive for delay and breach. This is particularly true where the
breaching party is in a position of relatively strong bargaining power.
Thus, compensatory damages in contract cases have little effect in
preventing economic oppression. By strengthening the sanction against
breach of contract, the imposition of punitive damages operates to curb
the abuse of superior bargaining power.
14
Several writers have suggested that the trend toward imposing pu-
nitive damages in contract cases reflects courts' efforts to protect vul-
nerable parties against abuse of bargaining power by dominant
parties. 42 Although the subordinate party often will be a consumer
and the dominant party a large business concern, punitive damages
would be appropriate in any case in which the breaching party con-
sciously has sought to take advantage of the dependency that has re-
sulted from a contractual relationship. 143  As in tort cases, the
imposition of punitive damages should depend on whether the conduct
of the breaching party warrants the extra measure of deterrence that
punitive damages provide. 44
Naturally punitive damages should not be used to discourage par-
ties to a contract from resorting to the courts for settlement of a good
faith dispute. 145 The key factor, however, is good faith. If a breaching
party is unable to advance some reasonable basis in law or in fact for
fit[ting] the confines of a pre-determined tort," coupled with a public interest which is
"served by the deterrent effect" of punitive damages, justifies award).
140. See Sullivan, supra note 3, at 237, 251.
141. Id. at 249. The author also suggests that awarding punitive damages in contracts
cases is consonant with other doctrines of modem contract law, such as unconscionability,
that are designed to protect against the abuse of bargaining power. Id.
142. See id. at 249-51; Punitive Damages in Contracts Actions, supra note 3, at 688.
143. See, e.g., Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Central Beverage Co., 359 N.E.2d 566, 579-81
(Ind. App. 1977) (brewer termination of distribution agreement with beer wholesaler). See
also Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, supra note 3, at 687, suggesting that dependencies
resulting from a contract may create a type of fiduciary relationship.
144. See notes 75-95 & accompanying text supra.
145. See Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. App. 599, 610, 349 N.E.2d 173,
181 (1976); Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, supra note 3, at 685, 687-88.
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failing to perform contractual obligations, an inference of bad faith is
unavoidable. When this bad faith is coupled with disparity in bargain-
ing power, the sanction of punitive damages is appropriate.
Effectuating a Principled Approach
As this discussion demonstrates, the doctrine of punitive damages
can be a valuable device for strengthening the admonitory function of
the civil law. The troublesome question is how to put the theoretical
goals of the doctrine into practice. How can a court ensure that a
blameworthy defendant will not be punished too harshly by an in-
flamed jury? How, indeed, does a court determine the sum that will
effectively deter the defendant's conduct without bankrupting him or
her?
The easy answer is that the trial judge has the responsibility for
seeing that punitive damages are applied in a principled manner; yet
this job is far from easy. In a criminal trial, the trial judge at least has
the advantage of being guided by minimum and maximum penalties
established by the legislature. 146 Prior to sentencing criminal defend-
ants in most states, the judge may hold a special hearing in which addi-
tional information to guide in sentencing is received. 47 In a civil trial
in which punitive damages are sought, however, the judge has no such
guidance. Consequently, there is a danger that the paucity of standards
regarding punitive damages may cause the judge to hesitate to disturb
the jury's award, feeling that his or her judgment is no better than the
jury's. 4 8
Two changes in present practice are necessary to strengthen courts'
control over punitive damages awards. The first relates to the proce-
dure for imposing punitive damages and the second to the assessment
of the amount of such damages.
Procedural Reform
A common practice among courts is to instruct the jury that it may
award punitive damages if it finds that the defendant's conduct was
outrageous and evidenced "evil motives or. . . reckless indifference to
the rights of others." 149 The assessment of punitive damages is then left
146. See Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1169-70.
147. Id. at 1170.
148. See Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, supra note 3, at 672.
149. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973).
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to the discretion of the jury,150 subject to remittitur or the granting of a
new trial for excessive verdicts.' 15 One writer has noted the inherent
irony of requiring that the jury find the defendant's conduct to be out-
rageous, while reversing the verdict if the jury acts on this passionate
emotion. '
52
To increase the likelihood that punitive damages will be applied in
a principled manner, the judge, rather than the jury, should assess the
sum of the damages. 153 Although the judge is in no better position to
decide whether the defendant's conduct was outrageous, the question
of punishment calls for expertise. Delicate issues of economics and so-
cial policy are involved in deciding the amount of punishment-issues
with which the ordinary juror is likely to have little familiarity. 154 Be-
yond being more aware of the public policy implications of the award
of punitive damages, judges have more experience in meting out pun-
ishment. 15  They are less likely to be impressed by the histrionics of
counsel and so to be inflamed by passion or prejudice. Finally, the
judge could receive additional evidence, otherwise inadmissible or po-
tentially prejudicial, to aid in reaching an informed decision about the
proper sum of damages.
156
This procedure would parallel the present practice in criminal tri-
als in most states in which the sentence is imposed by the trial judge
after conviction by the jury. 157 This bifurcation of the adjudication and
sentencing functions is designed to avoid the possibility that the jury's
determination of guilt would be influenced by evidence of the defend-
150. See, e.g., Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Central Beverage Co., 359 N.E.2d 566, 581
(Ind. App. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973).
151. See note 49 supra. See generally Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W. VA. L.
REV. 1 (1942).
152. Owen, supra note 6, at 1320 n.304.
153. The shifting of the assessment function to the judge has been suggested by numer-
ous commentators. See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 220; DuBois, Punitive Damages in Personal
Injury, Products Liability and Professional Malpractice Cases: Bonanza or Disaster, 43 INS.
COUNSEL J. 344, 352-53 (1976); Owen, supra note 6, at 1320-25; Exemplary Damages, supra
note 1, at 530; Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1171. It is also provided for in
the Department of Commerce's Proposed Uniform Product Liability Law. See DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, DRAFT UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW § 120(b), 44 Fed. Reg. 3,002 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as DRAFT UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW].
154. See Morris, supra note 37, at 1179.
155. This experience stems largely from presiding over criminal proceedings. Owen,
supra note 6, at 1320.
156. Id. See notes 157-63 & accompanying text infra. The constitutionality of a sen-
tencing hearing in a criminal case, in which the judge received evidence outside the record,
has been upheld by the Supreme Court. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
157. See Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1171.
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ant's character and personality. 58 Perhaps, too, the system was struc-
tured to avoid situations in which a jury would compromise its doubts
about guilt with a light sentence.
This rationale would apply equally to a civil trial in which puni-
tive damages are sought. Much of the information that is needed to
impose a proper sum of damages may be too complex for the jury to
evaluate effectively. Evidence of the defendant's wealth, while admissi-
ble in most states, 159 may give rise to what one writer has dubbed the
"Robin Hood" syndrome.' 60 Similarly, evidence of past or present
criminal prosecution,1 6 1 or of other ongoing civil cases, 162 may influ-
ence the jury and lead it to compromise any doubts it may have on the
initial question of liability. Yet all of this information is vital for prin-
cipled application of punitive damages. To avert the possibilities of
compromise and overly harsh penalties, the questions of liability and
punishment should be separated, and the judge provided with access to
information that would otherwise be excluded.
If the record reasonably supports the inference that the defend-
ant's conduct warrants the imposition of punitive damages, the jury
should be instructed to decide whether punitive damages should be
awarded. Maintaining this decision as a jury function operates as a
check on the judge's decision and takes advantage of the jury's knowl-
edge of community standards. If the jury finds that punitive damages
should be awarded, the judge should then hold a special, in camera
hearing to assess the amount of the award.
During this hearing, the judge should hear any evidence outside
the record that would aid in assessing the amount of punitive damages,
unhampered by technical rules of evidence. After considering all of the
evidence and the policy factors outlined below, the judge could then
assess the amount of punitive damages. To facilitate appellate review,
a record should be made of this hearing, including written findings of
158. See G. MUELLER, SENTENCING PROCESS AND PURPOSE 3 (1977).
159. See, e.g., Coy v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 210, 373 P.2d 457, 23 Cal. Rptr. 393
(1962); Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Central Beverage Co., 359 N.E.2d 566, 581 (Ind. App.
1977); Hall v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 252 N.W.2d 421, 424 (Iowa 1977); Nelson v. Hal-
vorson, 117 Minn. 255, 135 N.W. 818 (1912). See generally Note, Punitive Damages: An
Exception to the Right ofPrivacyj." Coy v. Superior Court, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 145 (1977).
160. DuBois, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury, Products Liability and Professional
Malpractice Litigation: Bonanza or Disaster, 43 INs. COUNSEL J. 344, 353 (1976). See also
Morris, supra note 37, at 1191; Owen, supra note 6, at 1320-21; Exemplary Damages, supra
note 1, at 528.
161. See Morris, supra note 37, at 1197.
162. See Rheingold, The MER/29 Story -An Instance of Successl Mass Disaster Liti-
gation, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 116, 136 n.53 (1968).
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fact supporting the amount of the award.
163
Guidelines for Assessing the Amount of Punitive Damages
The problem with assessing punitive damages is that no quantita-
tive formula is possible, yet the judge must set a certain sum that will
effectuate the policy goals underlying punitive damages awards.164 Al-
though a quantitative formula would be comforting, it would be unde-
sirable. The deterrent effect of punitive damages would be minimized
if a person contemplating wrongful conduct could gauge his or her
maximum liability in advance. Similarly, any uniformity in a sanction
that strikes at wealth would pose the danger of being excessive for poor
defendants and inadequate for rich ones. 165 Judgment calls in assess-
ing punitive damages, therefore, are inescapable.
Many courts have sought refuge behind the rule that the amount
of punitive damages must bear a reasonable relationship to actual
damages. 166 This rule is artificial in that no specific ratio of punitive
damages to actual damages ever has been established. 167 In one juris-
diction, for example, ratios have been upheld that ranged between 0.18
to 1 and 12.5 to 1.168 The greater danger of the reasonable relationship
rule is that it can cut against the deterrent objective of punitive dam-
ages. 169 There are many cases in which, although actual damage is
slight, the conduct involved has such great potential to cause harm that
strong sanctions are warranted. For example, a person may attempt
murder but only succeed in frightening the victim, 70 or a seller may
commit a host of petty wrongs against consumers. Because the actual
damages in such cases are small, a rule that requires punitive damages
to correspond to compensatory damages would cause the award to fall
163. An alternative procedure is possible for those jurisdictions that find a complete
shifting of the assessment function to be too radical. Evidence of the defendant's wealth,
criminal prosecutions, and ongoing multiple civil litigation could be presented to the jury in
open court after it has found that the defendant is liable and that punitive damages are
warranted. The judge could then reduce by remittitur any excessive verdicts. But see Note,
Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1797, 1806-08 (1979).
164. See Owen, supra note 6, at 1315.
165. See Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1170.
166. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Auto Driveaway Co., I 1 Cal. 3d 908, 922, 523 P.2d 662, 672,
114 Cal. Rptr. 622, 632 (1974); Addair v. Huffman, 195 S.E.2d 739, 743-44 (W. Va. 1973).
For an excellent discussion of the reasonable relationship rule, see Morris, supra note 37, at
1180-81.
167. See Riley, supra note 61, at 216.
168. Id. at 216-17.
169. See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 210-11; Exemplary Damages, supra note 1, at 531;
Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1170-71.
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, Comment (b) (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973).
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short of its desired effect. The reasonable relationship rule is meaning-
less and should be abandoned.
171
The abandonment of the reasonable relationship rule would not
mean that the assessment of punitive damages would be thrown to the
gods. Rather, courts would be forced to balance society's interests
against the defendant's interests. The following factors may aid a court
in this process.
Severity of Threatened Harm. Punitive damages should bear a rea-
sonable relationship to the harm that is likely to occur from the defend-
ant's conduct, 172 as well as to the harm that actualy has occurred. If
the harm likely to occur or the harm that has occurred from such con-
duct is slight, the award of punitive damages should be relatively small.
If the threatened or actual harm is grievous, the amount of the award
should be more severe.' 73 This is certainly not a complete standard, for
if present intangible harms are difficult to gauge, potential harms are
impossible to gauge with certainty. Nevertheless, the severity of harm,
actual and threatened, is one factor that a court should consider in as-
sessing punitive damages. 174
Degree of Refprehensibility of Defendant's Conduct. As the defend-
ant's misconduct becomes more flagrant, the need to deter such con-
duct increases. In determining the need for deterrence, the court
should focus on such elements as the duration of the misconduct, the
degree of the defendant's awareness of the hazard, and any conceal-
ment of the hazard. 175 In addition, both the existence and the fre-
quency of similar past conduct would be relevant.
Profitabili y of the Conduct. Where the defendant has engaged in
wrongful conduct for a profit, the award of punitive damages should
remove the profit incentive. 76 Not only should the defendant be
forced to disgorge the profits, but an additional amount should be ad-
ded to the award so that the defendant realizes not a profit, but a
171. See Morris, supra note 37, at 1181-85; see generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 14 (4th ed. 1971); Riley, supra note 61, at 249.
172. See Morris, supra note 37, at 1181.
173. Id.
174. A recently enacted Minnesota statute identifies "the seriousness of hazard to the
public arising from the defendant's misconduct" as one of the factors to be considered in
assessing punitive damages. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(3) (West Supp. 1978).
175. See, e.g., id.; DRAFT UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW, supra note 153,
§ 120(b)(2), (4) & (5). See also Owen, supra note 6, at 1319.
176. See Owen, supra note 6, at 1316.
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Financial Position of the Defendant. Because the award of punitive
damages strikes at wealth, the defendant's ability to pay must be taken
into account. 178 A sum that is sizable for one person may be inconse-
quential to another. To accomplish the goal of deterrence, the sum as-
sessed must be large enough to punish the defendant without being
vindictive.
Amount of Compensatory Damages Assessed. The judge must scru-
tinize the jury's compensatory award to determine whether it contains
elements of retribution. If the compensatory award seems high in rela-
tion to actual injury, the jury's outrage at the defendant's conduct may
have spilled over into the compensatory award. If so, this fact should
mitigate the amount of punitive damages.
Costs of Litigation. Since one purpose of punitive damages is to
encourage plaintiffs to bring wrongdoers to justice, the judge should
consider the costs of such litigation to the plaintiff.179 This factor is
related to the foregoing one, in that the plaintiff may have been com-
pensated indirectly for costs through a large compensatory verdict.
Potential Criminal Sanctions. Any criminal penalties to which the
defendant may be subject should be taken into account in mitigation of
the punitive damages award. 80 If the defendant is being prosecuted
for a crime that carries a serious penalty, such as substantial loss of
liberty, society's interests probably are best vindicated by the criminal
system.' 8' Punitive damages in such a case probably should not be lev-
ied at all. In other cases involving criminal misconduct in which puni-
tive damages are appropriate, the judge should consider the total effect
of the punishment to which the defendant will be subjected.
82
177. See note 89 supra.
178. See DRAFT UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW, supra note 153, § 120(b)(6);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(3) (West Supp. 1978); Owen, supra note 6, at 1319; Exemplary
Damages, supra note 1, at 528; Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1170. See note
159 & accompanying text supra.
179. See Owen, supra note 6, at 1315, 1319. But see Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 363, 371 (1851).
180. See notes 115-18 & accompanying text supra.
181. Cf. Punishment by Civil Courts, supra note 14, at 1174-75 (criminal penalty should
abolish punitive damages).
182. See DRAFT UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW, supra note 153, § 120(b)(7);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(3) (West Supp. 1978); Owen, supra note 6, at 1319.
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Other Civil Actions Against the Defendant Based on the Same Con-
duct. Imposing punitive damages in multiple party or mass disaster
litigation has been the source of much concern.' 83 Several dangers are
inherent in such cases. Courts are concerned not only with the possibil-
ity that the defendant will be too harshly punished, 18 4 but also with the
danger that the first plaintiffs receiving judgments will deplete the re-
sources available for future litigants. 185 The suggestion that an escrow
fund be created for all litigants to share equally 86 does not seem prac-
tical.187 On the other hand, if punitive damages were abolished in such
cases, the result would be that "an entirely culpable defendant is re-
lieved of civil punitive awards when he injures many people, though he
would be held liable if he had injured only one."'
188
The best approach in this problematic area would be similar to
that taken in cases in which the defendant is subject to criminal punish-
ment. The judge should assess punitive damages in view of the total
punishment to which the defendant is subject, 8 9 giving more weight to
prior awards. 190 Moreover, as between multiple plaintiffs in such liti-
gation, one author has suggested that initial plaintiffs deserve any dis-
proportionate award they may receive, because of the greater cost and
ingenuity required of them.' 91 This position has merit, particularly in
view of the fact that subsequent plaintiffs may benefit, either by
favorable settlements or by favorable jury verdicts, from the efforts of
the frontrunners. 192
Conclusion
The doctrine of punitive damages has for too long been a bane of
the common law-misunderstood, disavowed, and disfavored. The
doctrine must be forthrightly recognized for what it is: a powerful tool
to be used in the civil law's job of controlling conduct. The doctrine
183. See, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967);
DOBBS, supra note 1, at 212-14; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 13
(4th ed. 1971); Morris, supra note 37, at 1194-95; Owen, supra note 6, at 1322-25.
184. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F. 2d 832, 838-51 (2d Cir. 1967).
185. Id. at 839-41.
186. See Gilden, Punitive Damages in Implied PrivateActionsfor Fraud Under the Secur-
ities Laws, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 646, 657 n.77 (1970).
187. See deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1232 (10th Cir. 1970).
188. DOBBS, supra note 1, at 213-14.
189. See note 182 & accompanying text supra.
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, Comment (e) (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973);
Note, Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1797 (1979).
191. Owen, supra note 6, at 1325.
192. Id.
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has not outlived its usefulness. In a society that becomes increasingly
impersonal and increasingly dominated by large business concerns,
which are in many ways beyond the law, there will always be the need
for a remedy that increases the existing admonitory function of the civil
law.
Nevertheless, the very power of the remedy demands that judges
exercise close control over the imposition and assessment of punitive
damages. To exercise meaningful control, judges need meaningful
standards. Although punitive damages will never be susceptible to lit-
mus paper tests or mathematical formulas, a consideration of the com-
posite of factors outlined herein will aid a court in ensuring that
punitive damages will be imposed only when justified by the policies
underlying the doctrine.
